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National cybersecurity strategies (NCSS) are becoming increasingly important for 
society. They provide essential support for the development of both digital and traditional 
infrastructure, and a well-designed strategy can have a tremendous positive impact on a 
country. Therefore, for developers of a new strategy or researchers of previously 
published ones, it is good to understand the current state of the art on evaluating national 
cybersecurity strategy documents. Unfortunately, while there is some research on these 
strategies and comparisons between them, the published work is superficial. Moreover, 
the publications do not disclose their research methods, so it is challenging to evaluate 
their results. These limitations make it difficult to rely on previous research.  
Objectives and proposed activities to achieve the desired outcomes form an essential part 
of a national cybersecurity strategy. However, little research on them exists. The relevant 
NCSS guides focus on structuring the entire drafting process at a high level, without 
details or suggestions on subtopics such as typical objectives or activities. This thesis 
addresses the research question: How are activities and objectives defined in the 
evaluation frameworks, and how do they relate to each other? In particular, can they be 
analyzed in a replicable way so that a body of knowledge of common and valuable 
objectives and activities in NCSS could be built?  
It turns out that the existing definitions for objectives are lax. There is no consensus 
between NCSS writers or researchers in this domain on defining an objective or activity. 
As a result, these are readily mixed in the source documents, and the analytical 
frameworks that were studied are not extracting them reliably from the source documents.  
The constructive analysis is one way of consistently defining the objectives and activities 
and applying a practical inference method to discover the connections between them. This 
approach was tested with the source material available from the previous works. 
By applying the method in this research, objectives, and activities were classified more 
rigorously. The classification work enabled a better understanding of the activities and 
further analysis of their relationships, which were then documented and organized into a 
graph representation. That graph of objectives and activities can help readers and 
developers of future strategies to think about how to organize the goals of their NCSS. 
Furthermore, this research could provide a way for systematically expanding the body of 
knowledge about the requirements and dependencies, thus making it more 
straightforward to include objectives and activities in future strategies. 
Finally, several future research avenues are discussed, which would expand the 
knowledge about the NCSS documents and begin to track their evolution more robustly 
over time. For example, there are avenues for both manual analysis and machine-learning-
based unsupervised learning methods that could be applied for further insights. 
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Cybersecurity is a discipline needed to prepare us properly for the current and future 
challenges of the information systems-based society. Information technology has become 
woven into every aspect of our lives and promises a staggering amount of new 
opportunities. However, in a world where many actors do not have our best interests in 
mind, cybersecurity is necessary to secure the environment where people, government, 
and companies interact in this new environment (Lehto, 2013.) 
 Making that environment secure will help us reach the potential economic development 
resulting from the information-based society while countering some risks to personal 
privacy, commercial predictability, and national security. Moreover, cybersecurity 
generates trust and confidence, which enables prospering digital economy. (Teoh and 
Ahmad, 2017.) 
Government is responsible for protecting the safety of the citizens in the cyber domain at 
the country level. Every country is different, so by necessity, they will have varying 
objectives in cybersecurity. One country aims to increase the baseline cybersecurity 
capabilities; another country may be realigning its already significant capabilities to reap 
economic benefits. They may also have agenda of exerting the maximum influence on 
other countries in the cyber domain. 
A national cybersecurity strategy is significantly different from a cybersecurity strategy 
of an organization. An organizational cybersecurity strategy aims to secure a bounded 
system against disturbances that can damage the business, viability, or reputation. There 
are guides for creating this kind of organizational strategy (Woody and Ellison, 2020), 
but these guides are not applicable for devising a national cybersecurity strategy. 
The purpose of the national cybersecurity strategy is to set the vision and objectives to be 
accomplished, define the domain to be secured, divide the responsibilities for activities 
to the different authorities, and put the short and long-term goals and priorities for those 
participating in the effort. It sets out what approach and means will be used to reach those 
goals, and it may also define the timeframe for completing the improvements. As the size 
of government investment into cybersecurity for individual countries grows into billions 
annually (Network Security, 2016), having the state’s resources aligned to achieve those 
goals is crucial. 
The national cybersecurity strategy (NCSS) is also a governmental communications tool 
to improve the national information infrastructure’s resiliency. It aligns all the 
stakeholders’ vision and communicates the grand project’s objectives and activities. An 
excellent strategy document includes definitions of how the success of its implementation 
will be measured and when it needs to be updated. Updating the strategy to match with 
the environment is necessary for it to remain relevant for the government. 
Europe is one of the world’s most progressive regions, based on the number of published 
NCSS documents by the EU member states and publication date for the first versions. At 
the time of writing, all 27 EU member countries have published such a document. In 
addition, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 
has been guiding and providing resources for EU member states for some years to set up 
effective NCSS. For example, the Good Practice Guide on NCSS (Falessi, Gavrila, 
Klejnstrup, & Moulinos, 2012) and an evaluation Framework for NCSS (Robinson, 
Horvath, van der Meulen, Harte, & van der Sar, 2014.) 
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Despite the internet having been quite central to most people’s everyday activities since 
the early 2000s, cybersecurity policy is still a topic where only the more forward-looking 
countries have extended experience. Very few of the NCSS documents are beyond their 
second editions. In Europe, only five countries have published three editions of their 
cybersecurity strategy: Finland, Estonia, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg. Many 
countries are still implementing their first versions, which typically have 4 to 6-year 
lifetimes. (Enescu, 2020.) 
There is limited experience in crafting cybersecurity policies. At this phase of the NCSS 
document availability, the community writing them is still striving to establish a good 
enough foundation for building the future iterations of their NCSS documents. Efforts 
and guidance to this end have now been spearheaded by International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 
(GCSCC) at the University of Oxford. 
According to a listing compiled at CIPedia.eu (Luiijf, 2019), 104 nations have, as of Feb 
2021, published one or more NCSS document versions. That means just about half of all 
countries have done so. The publication pace is steadily increasing as others seek to catch 
up with those with a strategy for national cybersecurity. 
Research into cyber security strategies makes them more effective and robust and ensures 
a better fit in the practical and political situation in which they are published. In addition, 
documenting the common NCSS objectives and their requirements and dependencies 
informs the preparatory studies and evaluations of previous strategies that precede the 
new iteration of the strategy. While countries have varying starting points, there are not 
dramatically different desired outcomes, and infrastructure and citizens are protected in 
the same way regardless of the continent. In the end, cyber security in one country is quite 
similar to another. The differences are about where they are starting and where they want 
to arrive in a few years. Therefore, academics have great potential to help the government 
officials tasked with developing the strategies.  
As more NCSS documents are becoming available for analysis, it is possible to study how 
they are typically structured. Analyzing many of them can also help answer the question, 
“what should they contain?” Results from these analyses are helpful for those who need 
to write NCSS documents of their own. There is a tremendous amount of duplicated work 
in cybersecurity strategy development when experts in each country come up with the 
objectives and evaluate how practical those are to reach within the available means and 
time.  Additionally, the availability of supporting research makes the strategies easier to 
write. 
Even though cyber security strategies are essential in modern society, there appears to be 
very little existing research on how well the strategies work and how they could be 
improved. The supporting material available for the practitioners barely extends beyond 
guides written by various interest organizations. The majority of academically published 
research typically restricts their scope to either describing the process of how a particular 
strategy was developed or to comparisons of strategies in pairs. The most extensive 
comprehensive analysis of NCSS documents extends to 19 documents, and the results of 
it turned out to be challenging to trace back to the source material. From the information 
processing science viewpoint, these strategies can also be evaluated using automated 
machine learning-based algorithms, but the applicability of that research is still an open 
question. 
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Regardless of the above, the analyses are helpful source material to study how the various 
existing NCSS documents relate to each other and observe what commonalities exist. 
Each existing analysis of multiple strategies naturally has a different viewpoint and 
approach, and consequently, produces somewhat different results from the others.  
This thesis identified some of the differences in the approaches used to analyze the NCSS 
documents and looks for ways to improve the strategies. Comparative and lexical 
analysis-based studies are appropriate for this field because the available data used in the 
existing analyses have not been enough for in-depth statistical analysis. However, that 
kind of study will become feasible once studies incorporate most of the current strategies 
into their scope and the number of available NCSS documents increases. In addition, the 
methodologies that were used in the previous studies were not documented, so using the 
lexical analysis applied in this work can provide a more rigorous starting point. 
The primary research question was: What is the current state of evaluating national 
cybersecurity documents?  
Research into the NCSS evaluation frameworks also made it apparent that there was a 
fascinating disconnect between the results of the existing evaluation frameworks when it 
came to the definition of activities extracted from the NCSS documents. The results of 
the current studies were compared to sample strategies to identify how closely they were 
associated with the source material. The topic of object/activity definitions is of particular 
interest. Observations about the activities as listed in the evaluation frameworks lead to 
additional research questions: 
How are activities and objectives defined in the evaluation frameworks, and how do they 
relate to each other? 
There is very little published guidance on this area of cybersecurity objective and 
activities definitions, generally limited to a few paragraphs of high-level commentary on 
the NCSS guidance documents. Better definitions for these objectives in certain areas are 
identified by analyzing objectives listed in the evaluation frameworks, with the aim that 
future document analyses adopting these improvements would produce more consistent 
results and so that those analyses could be more readily replicated.  
To properly study the results of various analyses, one needs to assess the results from a 
valuable perspective for the community. NCSS documents usually target multiple 
audiences, such as other parties within the government, the private sector, and individual 
citizens. Any of these would be suitable choices from the analysis perspective. However, 
the governmental perspective of the future writers and policy-makers of NCSS strategies 
was chosen because it can help push this field forward. This thesis will consider the 
objectives and activities one can define in the NCSS, based on the previous research, and 
strive to document their relationships.  
This thesis aims to help the reader understand how commonly defined activities in NCSS 
documents relate to each other, how they have been investigated and compared in the 
past, and how they could be further studied. The results also provide insights into what 
kind of analyses are possible and feasible. 
The research material for the thesis was selected in the literature review phase primarily 
based on how many NCSS documents we studied in the analysis. Differences in the 
selected evaluations were compared to each other, and shared parts of the topic grouping 
work done in the earlier research were investigated. Interesting perspective differences 
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were discovered in how researchers approached the topic groupings. However, there is 
no apparent consensus on how the objectives and activities of NCSS documents are 
defined were found in the research frameworks. 
The content of one of the NCSS document analyses that included an extensive list of 
extracted objectives and activities was investigated by using constructive analysis. Then, 
the content from the study was further refined by the categorization into objectives and 
activities. The categorization was performed by applying the practical inference method 
with reasonable success. The resulting categorization was then compared to the available 
source material to validate the research method.  
Following the categorization, links between the activities were studied, and the linked 
activities are mapped to a graph format. The activities were then further analyzed to 
discover the level of abstraction and connections between them. Abstraction level was 
found by applying a topological sorting method on the graph of discovered activities by 
their connections. Describing the discovered activities in a meaningful way sorted by their 
dependencies is one of the thesis’s primary contributions. Furthermore, it offers a 
practical way to discover valuable information for developing future cybersecurity 
strategies. 
The research also shows that several potential novel approaches for further research 
would appear to be feasible. The source material has diversified and improved 
significantly since the previous comprehensive analysis was performed and is past due 
for a new analysis. Besides different kinds of manual research, the domain is now a good 
candidate for additional machine learning-based approaches. A few different lines of 
inquiry discussed at the end offer new ways to advance research into this topic of NCSS 
document analysis. 
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2. Prior research on national cybersecurity 
strategies 
Relevant research into cybersecurity strategies can be classified into a few categories. 
First, research establishes the function of cybersecurity strategies and provides some 
guidelines on how to write one, and then there is research analyzing existing strategies. 
However, before getting into them, defining what we mean with cybersecurity and 
cybersecurity strategies is essential to establish what we are trying to improve. 
2.1 Cybersecurity and strategy 
Cybersecurity is a term with a wide variety of definitions. Some definitions are very 
narrow and describe what used to be known as information security, while other 
definitions are expansive. Some include everything related to the information 
infrastructure and assets and then expand to encompass how people in the information 
era interact with that infrastructure and how information security affects society.  
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) offers the following definition:  
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and 
user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, 
personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the 
totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity 
strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the 
organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment” 
(International Telecommunications Union, 2019.) 
The above definition by ITU is somewhere in the more expansive end of the spectrum as 
it includes more terms and areas of focus. Their definition would be well aligned with the 
study of national cybersecurity strategies that share that perspective.  
There have been attempts to define cybersecurity's meaning by a commonality analysis 
of definitions extracted from multiple sources (Schatz, Bashroush, & Wall, 2017). Using 
this approach, the definition that most closely matches that consensus view is the first 
part of the definition offered in the NCSS document of South Africa and the first sentence 
of ITU’s definition. Therefore, that could be considered to be a de facto standard 
definition. 
Von Solms (2013) has argued that the difference between information security and 
cybersecurity is precisely this expansion of concern from protecting information to 
protecting the people who use those information systems. For example, he presents cyber 
home automation and cyber terrorism scenarios as cases where the damage is to society’s 
physical assets and order. Politically motivated influence cyber operations (ICO) have 
become much more prominent in the last few years and provide another excellent example 
of cybersecurity concerns that transcend information security. Brangetto and Veenendaal 
list different kinds of operations included in the ICO category. The operations mix 
information infrastructure-related attacks with attacks that target persons and institutions, 
such as doxing. (Brangetto and Veenendaal, 2016.) 
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As is the case with the definition of cybersecurity itself, cybersecurity strategies likewise 
do not have an established or commonly accepted definition. That, of course, does not 
mean that there are no definitions, and several parties have attempted to offer one, such 
as Azmi et. al: 
“a careful plan or method of protection both informational and non-informational assets 
through the ICT infrastructure for achieving a particular national goals usually over a 
long period of time” (Azmi, Tibben, & Khin, 2016, s. 2). 
 ITU does not provide a single sentence definition in the NCSS development guide but 
instead offers a list of ways to think about the cybersecurity strategy: 
 An expression of the vision, high-level objectives, principles, and priorities that 
guide a country in addressing cybersecurity; 
 An overview of the stakeholders tasked with improving the cybersecurity of the 
nation and their respective roles and responsibilities; and 
 A description of the steps, programmes, and initiatives that a country will 
undertake to protect its national cyber-infrastructure and, in the process, increase 
its security and resilience. 
(International Telecommunications Union, 2018, s. 13.) 
These guidelines are helpful. In the ITU definition, it is noteworthy how the high-level 
objectives are mentioned separately from the steps and initiatives necessary to understand 
what will be done.  
The definition of cybersecurity strategy can also be looked at from the perspective of the 
motivation that countries offer for presenting one. Azmi explains ten motivations that can 
be further grouped into three main categories: national security, jurisprudence, and 
politics. (Azmi et al., 2016.) 
When it comes to the contents of national cybersecurity strategy documents, a distinction 
can be observed between documents that mix strategy and implementation into a single 
document and approaches where those are separated into two separate documents. 
2.2 Cybersecurity strategy evaluation frameworks 
This section discusses the related research on the National Cybersecurity Strategies and 
the existing evaluation frameworks used to study the strategy documents that were 
selected as primary sources.  
After reviewing the literature, there are four primary sources to consider when reviewing 
NCSS documents and evaluations. Three sources are analyses of NCSS documents that 
review, summarize and manually categorize a significant number of documents (10-19). 
The fourth analysis attempts to use clustering and topic modeling methods to discover 
what topics may exist in the more extensive set of sixty NCSS documents. Each of these 
approaches provides different kinds of insight into what NCSS documents typically have 
in common. 
Luiijf et al. have, in their work, analyzed and compared 19 different NCSS documents 
worldwide (Luiijf, Besseling, & De Graaf, 2013). The research paper included as a 
primary source is an expanded work based on his earlier analysis of 10 NCSS documents 
in 2011 (Luiijf, Besseling, Spoelstra, & de Graaf, 2011). Thus, the second publication can 
11 
be considered to supersede the original. Their study does not explicitly set out to develop 
a framework for evaluating the documents in the future. Instead, it documents the result 
of applying a comparative study technique into several NCSS documents.  
When discussing the comparison results, Luiijf describes an ideal NCSS document based 
on a standard set of features identified from the research material. Luiijf’s proposition for 
an ideal structure provides a valuable template, and it is a good candidate for comparison 
to other frameworks (Luiijf et al., 2013). However, given that no other works propose a 
structure for an NCSS document, there is no existing review of this part of their study.  
ENISA has published an evaluation framework for analyzing NCSS documents. The 
framework was developed by analyzing existing NCSS documents, complemented by a 
literature review. The model that ENISA produced consists of a logic model for 
describing the content and structure and a set of possible Key Performance Indicators 
(KPI) for tracking the performance of the document. The NCSS evaluation framework 
published by ENISA (Robinson et al., 2014) developed by the EU Cybersecurity 
authorities to aid the EU member states in their work serves as a primary source.  
In addition to presenting the framework, the authors also discuss the results of studying 
several European NCSS documents and the frameworks used to compose them. 
Additionally, in the ENISA study, the authors performed a survey of national 
cybersecurity authorities to extract additional information about their respective national 
strategies. They also interviewed public sector stakeholders to get a better overview of 
the domain. Finally, since the studied NCSS documents did not apply a systematic 
program-level evaluation framework, the authors also created one for this scenario.  
The third primary source is a report produced by the OECD that analyzed existing NCSS 
documents and collected data from governmental cybersecurity strategy decision-makers. 
OECD analysis differs from the work of Luiijf in that they did not rely exclusively on the 
information that was printed in the NCSS documents but instead composed a set of 
questions that an appropriate authority in the 10 OECD member countries responded to 
then used that information in their analysis. Moreover, unlike in the analysis of ENISA, 
they did not directly interview any experts. (Bernat et al., 2012.) 
The clustering algorithm-based approach attempted by Kolini et al. provides an 
interesting perspective into this research because it sidesteps the inherent human grouping 
biases for the documents and relies on the frequency of relevant words to extract a set of 
topics sharing certain similarities from the source material. Human evaluation is then 
applied to describe the machine-generated topics and assign them meaning based on the 
context found in the analyzed documents (Kolini and Janczewski, 2017.)  
There are also several other attempts at analyzing the NCSS documents besides the three 
mentioned above. For example, Min has studied an NCSS document’s essential features 
(Min, Chai, & Han, 2015), while Shafqat has defined a helpful set of metrics for analyzing 
the documents (Shafqat and Massod, 2016).  
Also, Lehto has analyzed the high-level structure of NCSS documents and identified 
which sections have the most commonalities and which sections have the most 
considerable variance between different documents (Lehto, 2013). Additionally, there is 
an analysis comparing NCSS documents in EU and NATO contexts, but it is limited to 
analyzing high-level commonalities and differences (Štitilis, Pakutinskas, & 
Malinauskate, 2017). 
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These approaches would be suitable for complementing the detailed analysis performed 
in the four primary sources. However, they do not extract a sufficient amount of material 
from the source documents in the way that the primary sources do, which sets them apart. 
2.3 The aim of the NCSS document 
Although this study’s focus is to understand how NCSS documents have been analyzed 
and understand the activities defined in the NCSS documents, it is beneficial to 
understand these documents' purpose better. Their purpose can describe the aims and 
priorities needed for a nation to develop in a positive direction in cybersecurity. NCSS 
document needs to set forth these priorities straightforwardly, making it easy for the 
implementers to work towards them and align with each other. 
Luiijf identifies three general aims for the NCSS document (Luiijf, 2013, pp. 4-5): 
 Aligning the government 
 Coordinating the focus, roles, and responsibilities of the various stakeholders 
 Conveying the national intent to other nations and stakeholders 
The ENISA guide proposes the aim of the strategy as follows: “The aim of a cybersecurity 
strategy is to increase the global resilience and security of national ICT assets, which 
support critical functions of the state or of the society as a whole.” (Robinson et al., 2014, 
p. 8) 
The definitions are similar, but in the ENISA version, the communications function is left 
out. The omission is interesting, as one of the ENISAs main functions is to communicate 
strategic advice to the European member states. One would think that the emphasis would 
be reflected in their publications.  
2.4 Ideal contents of an NCSS 
In their comparative study of 19 different NCSS documents (Luiijf et al., 2013), Luiijf 
also proposes a structure for an NCSS document to effectively communicate the vision 
and the common goals of such strategy. Clear communication is essential to the 
authorities tasked with implementing the plan and the citizens that the strategy was 
intended to protect. Moreover, Luiijf argues that following a predefined structure would 
also help each country avoid omitting any crucial details in a strategy.  
The proposed structure is as follows: 
1. Executive Summary. 
2. Introduction. 
3. Strategic national vision on cybersecurity. 
4. Relationship of the NCSS with other strategies, both national and international, 
and existing. [sic] 
5. Guidance principles. 
6. Relationship with other strategies, both national and international, and existing 
legal frameworks.  
7. Cybersecurity objective(s), preferably one to four. 
8. Outline of the tactical action lines. 
9. Glossary preferably based on an international harmonized set of actions. 
10. [Optional] Annex. Envisioned operational activities defined in a SMART way. 
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(Luiijf et al., 2013) 
The 4th point in the proposed ideal structure seems identical to the 6th and includes a 
printing mistake. The mistaken duplication was confirmed in correspondence by the 
author, and there was no 4th point that had been omitted. With these changes, the result is 
a list of eight required sections and one optional. 
There is also further research on developing the ideal contents in the guides published by 
GCSCC (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, 2016) and ITU (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2018). In addition, other researchers have studied this in the 
context of their country’s national efforts to discover the best way to define their first or 
second versions of the NCSS documents. For example, research has been published in 
the context of one of the EU countries with highly developed IT infrastructure in 
Lithuania (Štitilis, Pakutinskas, Laurinaitis, & Malinauskaitė-van de Castel, 2017), or in 
the context of a country in a developing region in South Africa (Ellefsen, 2014).  
2.5 Cybersecurity capability maturity model for nations 
The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at Oxford University has 
developed a Capability Maturity Model-based approach for understanding the current 
capabilities of nations. The GCSCC dimension model’s research is interesting because it 
allows repeatable measurement of how existing strategies fit into their structure. The 
current model is in its second iteration, and it had been applied in 2017 to study the 
maturity level of more than 60 countries (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, 2016).  
 
The GCSCC publication contributes to this study by providing another reference set of 
capabilities in the five different dimensions that they chose to measure to rate the 
country’s capability. These capabilities can be compared with the other discovered 
frameworks to identify commonalities. Since the five dimensions are broken down into 
26 subitems, it also presents an interesting reference point for both OECD and Luiijf’s 
analysis of the activities. Many capabilities are the results of objectives and the associated 
activities defined in NCSS documents. The capabilities that exist can be independent of 
the strategy, developed organically over time by various stakeholders before the strategy 
itself was formulated. The GCSCC framework is practical in establishing the current level 





3. Research method 
The thesis started as a review of selected cybersecurity evaluation frameworks and was 
then expanded to cover the activity analysis. The goal was to find answers to the research 
questions: 
 How have national cybersecurity documents been evaluated? 
a. How do the evaluation frameworks compare with each other? 
b. How are activities and objectives defined in the evaluation frameworks? 
 How do the discovered activities relate to each other? 
There was a need for several different analytical approaches to dig into the research 
questions, work with and extract relationships with the conceptual analysis method from 
the activities and objectives, and then analyze their relationships using a relationship 
graph and topological sorting.  
The existing frameworks were studied by comparing them to each other. The comparison 
was made by looking systematically at the different steps identified by each of the 
frameworks and comparing them to see where they differ or if the other framework 
omitted that step. This work is presented in chapter 4 of the thesis. 
3.1 Evaluation framework selection criteria 
Since this thesis is a review of a set of research projects that attempt to analyze NCSS 
documents using various research methods, it needs to have selection criteria for the 
papers that perform NCSS document analysis. The first criteria for source selection is the 
depth of the material studied in the publication. The research should have analyzed 
several strategy documents to have enough content to be beneficial compared to other 
analyses. In practice, research where analysis of fewer than three documents was done – 
such as comparing two NCSS documents – is not sufficient for it to be included as a 
primary source.  
The NCSS documents that the research analyses should be from countries with published 
official documents on the matter. Preliminary studies on unpublished NCSS documents 
did not meet the selection criteria. For example, numerous research publications describe 
the methodology and approach that a country uses to define its upcoming NCSS. These 
are not yet published NCSS documents and, as such, could not be included as material in 
this thesis. 
Search for the evaluation frameworks was conducted in online publication databases 
using keywords such as “cybersecurity strategy,” “national cybersecurity strategy,” and 
their spelling variations. An online search using a website search engine was also done to 
discover work published through various cybersecurity-related agencies. ENISA’s work 
was found in this way. The search was done only for studies published in the English 
language. Four published studies matched the selection criteria for a primary source after 
surveying the available literature for candidates and removing studies that did not cover 




Table 1: Relevant primary sources for the review 
Source Author 
Cybersecurity Policy Making at a Turning Point: 
Analyzing a New Generation of National Cybersecurity 
Strategies for the Internet Economy  
(Bernat et al., 2012) 
An evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security 
Strategies  
(Robinson et al., 2014) 
Clustering and Topic Modelling: A New Approach for 
Analysis of National Cyber Security Strategies  
(Kolini and Janczewski, 2017) 
Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies (Luiijf et al., 2013) 
 
3.2 Comparison of the existing frameworks 
Two different comparison methods were used to look at the differences between the 
analysis frameworks. The frameworks can be divided into two categories. First, three of 
them analyze the structure and intents of NCSS documents (Luiijf, ENISA, OECD) and 
propose ways to write a better NCSS. Second, two of them analyze objectives and 
activities (Luiijf and Kolini) and make conclusions about them.  
The first type of documents was reviewed by comparing the sections present and omitted 
and observing their differences. In addition, differences between approaches were noted, 
and they were also compared to observations from other related research material. 
The second set of analyses was studied and compared to each other based on the 
objectives and activities they reported to have found and which grouping or topics they 
proposed. These were then compared to each other to see if their findings could be 
validated in some way. 
3.3 Conceptual Analysis 
Previously published research in NCSS document analysis had not disclosed, or at least 
not published, their internal methodology on how the activity was defined. The lack of 
description of the previous research methods was an obstacle for comparing the defined 
activities in each analysis. As a result, it became necessary to arrive at a formal definition 
of activity while analyzing the NCSS related activities identified in the source material. 
With the definition at hand, they could be readily analyzed and compared to the results 
from other documents.  
One way to create such a definition is by using a conceptual analysis method. Conceptual 
analysis can be performed using three methods: constructive analysis, detection analysis, 
and reductive analysis. From these three methods, constructive analysis is used when the 
relations in the language terms studied are not explicit. Its purpose is to make those 
relations explicit. Kosterec provides a methodology for devising a model for analyzing 
the activities using the tools that constructive conceptual analysis provides.  (Kosterec, 
2016.)  
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3.3.1 Constructive analysis methodology 
The constructive analysis method described by Kosterec includes six sequential steps that 
should be followed to apply the method. This chapter describes how those steps are 
applicable and were applied in the research method adopted for this thesis. 
1. Specify the initial conceptual background, CB! 
The method was applied in the context of analyzing activities discovered in the NCSS 
documents. Frameworks analyzed did not posit any relationships between the activities; 
they were taken as-is from the source documents. The activities were also given without 
background information on how they were chosen. 
2. Formulate the conceptual problem, P! 
Activities compose a more extensive set of tasks that need to be achieved for realizing a 
cyber secure country, and it is assumed that those tasks must be related to each other in 
some yet undefined way. Thus, there may be more than one relationship, and the same 
relationships may not apply to all the activities.  
The set of activities to be analyzed is not complete; many activities could be added, but 
the operative set comprises the activities discovered from the studied NCSS documents. 
In addition, there is no guarantee that all the activities are related to each other directly; 
the set may relate to each other through a third activity that is not defined and may not 
have been included in the set.  
On investigation, there did not appear to be existing literature that would explain these 
relationships. However, there may be documents that provide those activities in a context 
that could establish some relationship between them. Delving into the context present in 
the source documents was beyond the scope of this research. 
3. State the new conceptual relation R! 
What was interesting for this thesis is the relation: is activity A related to activity B. We 
also seek to identify the prerequisites of the relation: which activity is required for another 
activity?  
If sorted in this way, what can be said about the activities? Later, we also seek to establish 
the level of abstraction but can only do so only in the activities’ context. Because the level 
of abstraction is only established within the set of activities, the ability to do it is 
contingent on first establishing the relations themselves. Once all the relationships have 
been documented, the level of abstraction can be established. 
4. Formulate tests T of the conceptual relation R within CB! 
The conceptual relations were evaluated using the structured phrase template applied 
from the practical inference method, which asserts a relationship between the investigated 
terms if one can not be accomplished without the other.  
5. Elaborate the new relation R by tests T respecting CB!  
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If that relationship holds, one is an objective, and another is a prerequisite activity to 
achieve that objective. Inverting the relation should not make logical sense. Activities 
were compared using the practical inference test and classified into objectives and 
activities based on this relation.  
6. If the relation R succeeds in tests, declare it a part of CB!  
Once the activities were successfully classified using the method, the resulting activity 
graph was a formalized representation of the activities’ dependencies. These 
dependencies represent the improved conceptual background that was the goal for 
applying this method.  Subsequently, a list of the activities was produced. Each activity 
was categorized to likely be an objective or a proper activity. The resulting knowledge of 
the relations could also be used in sorting the activities topologically. 
3.3.2 Practical inference method 
In this work, the concept of practical inference (Von Wright, 1963), was used as a guide 
to check whether a given activity should be regarded as such. The application of practical 
inference was necessary to perform step 4 in the constructive analysis method. Von 
Wright uses the concept of practical inference in the context of presenting the necessary 
means to an end in logical arguments. 
One way of defining activity is to look at how it fits into a logical argument. Activity, as 
understood in the context of these NCSS documents, is a means to an end. That is to say; 
if one wishes to achieve a specific objective, one must take action to accomplish it. The 
practical inference is a logical argument with its roots in theoretical and practical 
syllogisms that Aristotle described. To describe the structure of practical inference, we 
will use one of von Wrights own examples: 
One wants to make the hut habitable. 
Unless the hut is heated, it will not become habitable. 
Therefore, the hut must be heated. 
(Von Wright, 1963, p. 60) 
The first statement is a premise, the “end” that one wishes to apply the means to 
accomplish. Without this goal, it is not possible to proceed with the analysis. 
The second statement is also a premise, but the first premise depends on its success. The 
desired end will not be reached unless the action described in the second statement is also 
completed. Thus, the second part is the “means” to an end described in the first premise. 
The third statement expresses practical necessity, and it is extracted from the two 
premises. An action must be performed to reach an objective. Without action, the 
objective will not be accomplished. The necessity is strict only when studying the 
inference from the strict first-person perspective. When the same person wishes to 
accomplish an objective for which he knows the requisite action, the Aristotelian view 
always leads to action and leaves no room for choice. However, there is also the 
possibility that the subject may be unable to perform the necessary actions to reach the 
objective because he does not know about it. 
The primary practical inference method of von Wright, as described, was applied to the 
activities that had been discovered from the existing research on NCSS documents, and 
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it proved to be a valuable tool to map out the relationships between the activities. Thus, 
each discovered link between the activities shows us a relationship between them.  
In theory, while this method precludes circular dependencies between two activities, it is 
possible to have a circular relationship between the activities if three activities depend on 
each other in a sequence. Loops were not observed in the set of activities investigated in 
this thesis, but it is still a possibility. Whether or not that will happen should more 
activities are added to the analysis remains undefined. 
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4. Comparing the existing analyses 
This section explores and compares the primary sources that were identified in this study. 
The main sources were the four different analysis frameworks with a sufficiently large 
base of the source material. There are several significant differences in how these 
comparisons group the topics seen in the NCSS documents and their weight to specific 
topics. Topics in this context are groupings of activities that will be identified later. 
Relation to other national strategies is explored in detail in the Luiijf comparison but not 
mentioned in any significant detail in the ENISA analysis, nor is it mentioned in the topic 
clustering approach. Since only one primary source does this kind of exploration, it is 
impossible to perform any comparative analysis. 
There was one category, “guiding principles,” that only exists explicitly in Luiijf’s 
analysis. Some of the ENISA framework content added under the identified “guiding 
principles” sub-section could be part of either strategic objectives or program-level 
objectives but are not comparable to Luiijf’s work. The OECD publication does not 
approach this topic, and Kolini’s work is not trying to develop that kind of material so 
that no meaningful comparisons can be made on it.  Much more information on the 
guiding principles can be found in supporting materials, such as the research into devising 
cybersecurity strategies from GCSCC. 
4.1 Overview of the NCSS analyses 
The four primary comparative analyses in this thesis overlap in their source material based 
on how early the respective countries’ NCSS documents were published. There is also 
overlap on what the interesting geographical areas were for the studies’ authors. The 
OECD analysis is focused on the organization’s member countries, just as ENISA 
analysis focuses only on the European countries. Luiijf’s and Kolini’s work includes all 
the countries that had published NCSS documents and made them accessible when 
writing their research papers. Since these publications are from 2011-2017,  the research 
does not cover all the currently available NCSS documents.  
While the ENISA analysis is focused entirely on European Union member countries, they 
also list various documents outside Europe as referenced source material. However, the 
publication does not mention whether they used them in the background analysis, and the 
visualized analysis results focus on Europe. Based on that, it is unclear whether the 
referenced NCSS documents’ content was used as a basis for the analysis that leads to the 
proposed framework include content from those documents or whether they are merely 
referenced some additional documents for due diligence purposes.  
The OECD material is not directly useful for comparison purposes since the analysis 
focuses on the written responses to their questionnaire rather than evaluating the material 
in the NCSS documents. However, it produces a valuable categorization model that can 
be used in association with the other frameworks. 
The following Table 2 summarizes the countries that were included in all the analyses 
and showed the overlapping countries based on analysis and references: 
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Table 2: Countries whose NCSS document has been included in one or more analyses that were evaluated. 
Country Luiijf ENISA OECD Kolini 
Afghanistan No No No Yes 
Albania No No No Yes 
Australia Yes Referenced Yes Yes 
Austria No Yes No Yes 
Bangladesh No No No Yes 
Belarus No No No Yes 
Belgium No Yes No Yes 
Canada Yes Referenced Yes Yes 
Colombia No No No Yes 
Croatia No No No Yes 
Cyprus No No No Yes 
The Czech Republic Yes Yes No Yes 
Denmark No No No Yes 
Egypt No No No Yes 
Estonia Yes Yes No Yes 
Finland No Yes Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Georgia No No No Yes 
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ghana No No No Yes 
Hungary No Yes No Yes 
Iceland No No No Yes 
India Yes Referenced No Yes 
Ireland No No No Yes 
Italy No Yes No No 
Jamaica No No No Yes 
Japan Yes Referenced Yes Yes 
Jordan No No No Yes 
Kenya No No No Yes 
Latvia No No No Yes 
Lebanon No No No Yes 
Lithuania Yes Yes No Yes 
Luxembourg Yes Yes No Yes 
Malaysia No No No Yes 
21 
Malta No No No Yes 
Montenegro No No No Yes 
Morocco No No No Yes 
The Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes 
New Zealand Yes Yes No Yes 
Nigeria No No No Yes 
Pakistan No No No Yes 
Poland No Yes No Yes 
Portugal No No No Yes 
Qatar No No No Yes 
Romania Yes Yes No No 
Russia No No No Yes 
Saudi Arabia No No No Yes 
Scotland No No No Yes 
Singapore No No No Yes 
Slovakia No Yes No Yes 
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
South Africa Yes Referenced No Yes 
South Korea No No No Yes 
Sweden No No No Yes 
Switzerland Referenced Referenced No No 
Taiwan No No No Yes 
Turkey No No No Yes 
Trinidad No No No Yes 
The United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The United States of America Yes Referenced Yes Yes 
Uganda Yes No No No 
 
Since the publication of the previous analyses, many countries have produced new or 
updated their existing NCSS documents. A large number of those have not been included 
in these studies. The included documents cover a bit more than half of all the currently 
published documents. For some documents, the analysis was done for a previous version 
of the document that has now been rewritten. 
4.2 Objectives 
Both Luiijf’s and ENISA’s comparison analyses identify objectives as a significant factor 
in the NCSS documents. The ENISA analysis splits the objectives into two categories: 
strategic and program-level objectives distinguished by abstraction. Luiijf identifies only 
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strategic goals. While acknowledged to be part of the research methodology in previous 
research, objectives are not included in the research methodology in the computational 
classification study of Kolini.  
There is some additional research into the objectives and activities defined in NCSS 
documents. For example, Enescu (Enescu, 2020) has studied the NCSS documents 
published by EU and European countries and identifies the following four high-level 
objectives under which the other activities can be grouped: 
1. National cooperation in European cybersecurity strategies 
2. International cooperation 
3. Awareness, education, research, and development 
4. Critical infrastructure protection and resiliency of the network and information 
systems 
This grouping into objectives is very high-level and does not help understand how the 
activities are linked to these objectives. Further analysis of this is done later with the 
activities in chapter 4.6. 
4.3 Stakeholders 
Stakeholder analysis is present in both ENISA and Luiijf’s analysis; however, some 
differences exist in the results’ grouping. Luiijf identifies seven stakeholder categories: 
 Citizens 
 SME  
 ISP 
 Large organizations 
 CI operators 
 The state / national security 
 Global infrastructure and issues. 
In the ENISA analysis, the grouping of the stakeholders is as follows: 
 Individual users 
 Business / private sector 
 Critical infrastructure 
 CERT 
 Public bodies 
Citizens and Individual users are a category that could be the same in both reports, as are 
the categories of CI operators and Critical infrastructure. However, Luiijf’s categorization 
in the private sector is more granular, splitting the “business / private sector” category 
present in the ENISA report into three sub-categories of SMEs, ISPs, and large 
organizations.  
Luiijf also mentions the state and national security as a stakeholder, which could be 
reasonable for this purpose, but it appears that the definition is too vague to be helpful. 
Therefore, ENISA omits that group and instead mentions a CERT as a stakeholder. A 
national CERT is undoubtedly a more tangible stakeholder as it is typically a well-defined 
organization established as part of government legislation. In some cases, they can be 
organizations with up to 25 years of history and usually operate under one of the relevant 




Action plans that the four analyses use have considerable differences in the definitions. 
Due to these observed differences, this topic was interesting to pursue a more in-depth 
analysis. 
ENISA discusses activities on a higher level, with the conclusion that “activities are not 
discussed in detail in the strategies to be identifiable and allow mapping,” i.e., there is 
not enough material for activity analysis in the NCSS documents. Discussion of the 
activities is also part of the chapter on outcomes and impacts. However, this is not true in 
the sense that Luiijf did manage to document a long list of activities and objectives. Those 
activities were mapped with each other. 
OECD report has identified action plans in the NCSS documents and reflects those 
findings against their earlier survey to identify key priority areas from 2004. However, 
the OECD report does not present the individual activities that they identified. Instead, 
they group the observed activities into six different categories with descriptions. 
Luiijf calls this feature of the NCSS documents tactical or operational action plans and 
goes into detail, identifying and tabulating 36 different activities or goals from the various 
analyzed NCSS documents. Since both OECD and Luiijf are studying an overlapping 
subset of the same document collection, the categories can be analyzed by grouping 
Luiijf’s activity findings according to the OECD categories. Also, since Luiijf’s work 
includes findings from a set of 7 NCSS documents not included in the OECD report, it is 
possible to evaluate how comprehensively the categories have been defined in the OECD 
report.  
The following are the six categories that OECD defines: 
1. Government security - Action plans include a multiplicity of initiatives, from the 
development of a situational awareness capacity to the rationalization of 
government network infrastructures, and the generalization of audits in the 
public sector.” 
2. Protection of critical information infrastructures - “Action plans generally 
include measures related to the protection of critical information 
infrastructures.” 
3. Fight against cybercrime - “action plans include many initiatives to develop law 
enforcement capacities, improve the legal framework and foster international 
co-operation on the basis of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention.” 
4. Awareness-raising - “Action plans include many initiatives targeting specific 
populations such as children, SMEs, and decision-makers in government and 
critical infrastructures.” 
5. Education - “action plans recognize in particular the need for a stronger 
cybersecurity workforce. The development of cybersecurity skills is identified as 
a key priority by several countries.” 
6. Response - “Strategies recognize the role played by Cybersecurity Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs), and create a national CSIRT or strengthen it where 
it already exists.” 
7. Other categories - Actions that did not have a clear fit into the OECD categories 
(Bernat et al., 2012) 
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The OECD categories are based on evaluation and questionnaires collected from NCSS 
related authorities from various countries. As they are one of the first publications on the 
topic, they form a baseline to which the work of others can be compared. While not an 
evaluation framework, the structure presented in the GCSCC guide can be compared to 
the OECD categories. GCSCC guide proposes the following dimensions for a 
cybersecurity strategy. In the document, each one is then decomposed into sub-items: 
1. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy 
1. National cybersecurity strategy – development, organization, content 
2. Incident response – identification of incidents, organization, 
coordination, mode of operation 
3. Critical infrastructure protection – identification, organization, risk 
management, and response 
4. Crisis management 
5. Cyber defense consideration – strategy, organization, coordination 
6. Communications redundancy 
2. Cyberculture and society 
1. Cybersecurity mindset – government, private sector, users 
2. Trust and confidence on the Internet – user trust and confidence on the 
Internet, user trust in e-government services, user trust in e-commerce 
services 
3. User understanding of personal information protection online 
4. Reporting mechanisms 
5. Media and social media 
3. Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills 
1. Awareness Raising – Awareness Programs for public and executives 
2. Framework for Education – Provisioning and administration 
3. Framework for Professional Training – Provisioning and uptake 
4. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks 
1. Legal Frameworks – For all aspects of society 
2. Criminal Justice System – Law enforcement, prosecution, and courts 
3. Formal and Informal Cooperation Frameworks to Combat Cybercrime 
5. Standards, organizations, and technologies 
1. Adherence to Standards – ICT Security standards, procurement 
standards, and standards in software development 
2. Internet Infrastructure Resiliency 
3. Software Quality 
4. Technical Security Controls 
5. Cryptographic Controls 
6. Cybersecurity Marketplace – Cybersecurity technologies and cyber 
insurance 
7. Responsible Disclosure 
(Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, 2016.) 
This list is an interesting comparison with the categories discovered in the OECD 
document, as seen in Table 3. Government security, protection of the critical information 
infrastructures, and response categories map well into the evaluation guide’s first 
dimension while fighting against cybercrime maps directly to dimension four. Both 
awareness-raising and education categories map into the identical third dimension. That 
leaves both GCSCC dimensions two (Cyberculture and society) and five (Standards, 
Organizations, and Technologies) outside the categories presented in the OECD work.  
 
25 
There may be many reasons for this mismatch. For example, there may be a lack of source 
material available in 2012, compared to the available material in 2016. For additional 
insight, it was considered whether the topics from the cluster analysis by Kolini (Kolini 
and Janczewski, 2017) are analogous to the OECD report categories. 
 
Table 3: Cybersecurity strategy topic categories from OECD study vs. GCSCC defined dimensions for 
cybersecurity strategies 
OECD category GCSCC dimension 
1. Government security 1. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy 
2. Protection of critical information 
infrastructures 
1. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy  
3. Fight against cybercrime 4. Legal and regulatory frameworks 
4. Awareness-raising 3. Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills 
5. Education 3. Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills 
6. Response 1. Devising cybersecurity policy and strategy 
  
 
The source material of Kolini’s study highly overlaps with the OECD analysis; it includes 
NCSS documents from all OECD countries included in the OECD NCSS analysis. In 
their analysis, a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) machine learning algorithm was 
applied to perform the clustering based on the NCSS source documents. The clustering 
algorithm produces a set of words seen to appear in the same context in the documents. 
The approach is also called topic modeling, effectively extracting a topic from the 
surrounding material, in this case, the NCSS document. The algorithm is unsupervised, 
and it does not imply any understanding of the contents of the documents, and the results 
are a set of words that define a topic.  
 
The topics identified in the analysis of Kolini are listed as follows. The authors labeled 
each topic based on their evaluation of what would be the best match. The list below omits 
the cluster of words that they were composed of: 
 
1. Defending citizens and public IT systems 
2. Organization/Sector for cybersecurity 
3. Cyberspace resiliency against attacks for critical sectors and infrastructure 
4. Develop policy and standard for technology and infrastructure 
5. Legislation and laws for cybercrime 
6. Public-Private and International cooperation 
7. Cybersecurity measure for cyber capabilities 
8. Training and awareness for the public, private sector, and online businesses 
9. Risk management procedures 
10. Critical infrastructure protection 
(Kolini & Janczewski, 2017.) 
There are similarities to the topics identified in the OECD analysis and Kolini’s proposed 
categories. Most of the categories can be mapped into the OECD proposed categories, 
although the wordings are not exact. Some of them would need to be mapped to the 
“other” category, which is a catch-all for everything else. 
Finally, beyond the evaluation frameworks, there is also more narrow research into NCSS 
documents that can be contrasted with the categories provided by OECD and Kolini. For 
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example, in his analysis of 8 NCSS documents, Lehto identified a set of six priorities 
found in almost every cybersecurity strategy. These are the high-level priorities that are 
close in meaning with the categories as proposed by OECD, and others: 
 Roles and responsibilities of cybersecurity 
 Cybersecurity Center / situational awareness 
 Legislation and supervising the lawfulness of government actions 
 Cybersecurity training and research 
 Secure IT products and services 
 National and International cooperation 
(Lehto, 2013, s. 189) 
Topics provided by Lehto are related but do not entirely overlap with the other studies’ 
topics. The lack of overlap shows how difficult it is to arrive at a consensus opinion on 
what topics are present in the NCSS documents. Each of the researchers brings their 
perspective into defining the topics, and their results are pretty different. 
Another perspective to consider is whether NCSS documents should include definitions 
or descriptions of activities at all. For example, one can argue that a strategy document 
should be restricted solely to present the objectives rather than describe the activities to 
achieve them. Activities would then be described in a separate cyber strategy 
implementation document. The split strategy and implementation plan approach is taken 
by Finland in their published NCSS documents from the year 2013 (Government of 
Finland, 2013) and 2019 (Government of Finland, 2019), and the accompanying 
implementation plan (Government of Finland, 2016).  
Other countries may also have taken this approach, which could mean that analysis of 
some of the NCSS documents – if taken as a stand-alone document – may not capture the 
intended activities to accompany the strategy. However, some NCSS documents 
explicitly mention activities, such as the Lithuanian NCSS (Government of Lithuania, 
2011), and Ireland (Government of Ireland, 2014.) The existence of both kinds of 
documents makes the NCSS documents more complex to analyze. 
With the proposed categorization scheme extracted from several different sources, it 
became possible to map the actions and action lines observed by Luiijf and see how they 
would distribute into the categories proposed by the OECD and Kolini. The mapping was 
performed for the list of activities discovered by Luiijf. The complete mapping is 
presented in Table 4 in the following analysis chapter.   
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5. Analysis of the activities 
In the previous chapter – while investigating how the different analyses handled the topic 
of activities – it became evident that each study’s authors must have had different 
definitions of what constitutes an activity. Following their respective definitions, they 
either found many activities in the source material or not many at all.  
While they did not share those definitions as part of the research publication, they 
assumed that they did not apply the same definition based on their analyses.  No one has 
proposed a definition in prior research for these activities as far as could be discovered in 
the literature search for this analysis. 
While it is not possible to assert the absolute truth, since the mapping is by necessity a 
subjective exercise that depends on the experience and expertise, the most likely result 
should be somewhere between these two positions. This disconnect between these 
analyses merits further investigation, as it is possible to propose methods to define these 
activities.  Those methods could help write future NCSS documents or when further 
analyzing the existing document base. 
In the research comparing the frameworks, it was notable how the objectives and 
activities were defined at different levels in the ITU’s definition of cybersecurity strategy 
(International Telecommunications Union, 2018). Therefore, in the analysis of the results 
in chapter four, that lack of distinction was studied more closely. 
5.1 Classifying the activities 
The following table is one of the key results from the research into the activities 
discovered in previous analyses. Table 4 enumerates all the “action and action lines” 
items from Luiijf’s work and combines them with the categories found from the OECD 
and Kolini’s research. It also contains further analysis data derived from the results of the 
relationship mapping. 
There are quite a few columns in Table 4, starting from the name of the activity from 
Luiijf’s research and a unique id number. The table shows the mapping of activities into 
the respective categories identified in the OECD analysis and described in chapter 4.6, 
followed by mapping the activities into the respective topics identified by Kolini in their 
clustering analysis.  
The table also presents “proximity groups,” the three high-level categories that the 
activities appear to fall into when organized topologically on the graph: activity (A), 
support (S), and policy (P), indicated with letters.  
Finally, the number of relationships of the activity in the relationship graph is listed in the 
second to last column of Table 4. These are the number of activities that form connections 
to this activity, as shown later in Figure 1 in chapter 5.7. The last column shows the 
calculated inbound/outbound connectivity percentage. The connection density is 




Table 4: Mapping of actions identified by Luiijf into the categories identified in OECD and Kolini’s 
research. 







count (Out / 
In) 
Out / In 
percent 
Active / dynamic security 
measures 
1 1,2 1,3 A 1/1 50 
Awareness and training / 
information security campaign 
2 4,5 8 P, A 7/2 28.5 
Adaptable policy to new ICT 
risk 
3 7 4 P, S 3/3 50 




P, A, S 3/4 75 
Critical infrastructure protection 5 2 10 A, S 3/9 33 
Cryptographic protection 6 7 3 A 6/0 100 
Cyber arms control 7 3 4,5 P 0/3 0 
Defense cyber operations / 
intervention, training and 
exercises 
8 4,5,6 3,8,9 A 0/4 0 
Develop and share good 
practices 
9 4,5 4,7,8 A 3/3 50 
Economic growth 10 7 N/A S 0/4 0 
Education and training 11 5 8 P 3/0 100 
Exercises 12 4,5 8 A 5/1 17 
Explicit holistic view 13 7 N/A P 3/0 0 
Exploitation to combat threats 14 1,3 N/A A 1/0 0 
Improved security of ICT 
products 
15 1,2,3 1,3 P 4/5 56 
Information sharing / exchange 16 1,2,3,4,6 N/A A, S 4/3 43 
Intelligence gathering on threat 
actors 
17 1,2,3,6 N/A A 3/0 0 
International collaboration 18 6 6 A 3/1 25 
Legislation / legal framework 19 1,3 5 P 3/0 0 
Mandating security standards 20 4,6 4 P 4/2 33 
National detection capability 21 2,6 10 A 1/4 80 
National response capability / 
ICT crisis management 
22 6 2 A 3/4 57 
Privacy protection 23 3,4 4,5 P 1/2 67 
Promote cyber-crime 
convention 
24 4 5 P 2/2 50 
Protection of non-critical infra 25 1,6 1,2 A 0/3 100 
Public-private partnership 26 7 6 S 2/3 60 
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Reducing adversary’s 
motivation and capabilities 
27 3 N/A P 0/6 100 
Research and development 28 5 N/A S 6/2 25 
Resilience against disturbances / 
threat and vulnerability 
reduction 
29 3,6 3 A 1/6 86 
Secure protocols and software 30 2,3,6 1,3 P, S 2/3 60 
Secure sourcing of products 31 2 4 P 1/1 50 
Self-protection of the 
government 
32 1 2 A, S 0/3 100 
Strategic cybersecurity council 33 1 N/A P, A, S 7/0 0 
Threat and vulnerability 
analysis 
34 4,6 9 S 3/1 25 
Tracing criminals and 
prosecution 
35 3 5 P 0/3 100 
Actions defined in a SMART 
way? 
36 7 N/A P, S 2/1 33 
 
 
5.2 Mapping of Luiijf’s activities to OECD and Kolini’s categories 
Table 4 presented all the mappings between Luiijf’s discovered activities to the categories 
proposed by OECD and Kolini. This mapping is subjective, as the actions presented by 
Luiijf do not have comprehensive descriptions. The activities also do not contain any 
links to the original material to validate the author’s observations. Thus, the only feasible 
method to trace back the claims would be to comb through all the referenced documents 
and identify the specific passages in the particular document that match the definition. 
The tracing was tested for some of the actions to see whether it is feasible, and it was, but 
reproducing the whole study is far beyond the scope of this work. 
Luiijf presents a list of strategic objectives that different countries have laid out in their 
NCSS documents. In this list of strategic objectives, it could be observed that there are 
quite a few of the same items that are later included in the list of activities and action 
lines. It is unclear whether these strategic objectives have been kept separate for some 
purpose during the analysis where activities were identified and listed from the source 
material. Another possibility is that, in the author’s opinion, they are otherwise 
independent of each other. It also requires some analysis and verification to infer whether 
items in the listed activities are taken from the listed strategic objectives. 
After mapping the actions into the proposed categories, the first observation was that 
many activities fit comfortably under several proposed categories. There are a few 
possible explanations for why the ambiguity exists: 
1. It is possible that the categories logically cannot be defined in a way that is precise 
enough, which by necessity means that there is ambiguity in how to sort the 
activities into categories 
2. The activity may be something that naturally falls into multiple distinctive 
categories because it encompasses multiple topics in itself, and it does not make 
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sense to merge those categories into a higher abstraction level that would subsume 
the specific definitions 
3. The OECD purposefully defines the categories in their report to make it 
practically impossible to assign an activity to a single category. That could be due 
to the intentionally ambiguous definition of the category, which in turn leads one 
to place the activities under several categories 
4. The activity in question may not be an actual activity but instead describes an 
objective that is part of the strategy, making it difficult to place into a proper 
category 
For three of the proposed explanations for the ambiguity, some solutions can be applied 
to resolve the activities’ fuzzy match against the presented categories.  
One could attempt to devise better categories to address the first explanation. Since there 
is now a larger pool of usable information in the form of NCSS documents to base the 
categories on, this could lead to further insights in creating the categories. Many more 
countries have published NCSS documents since the publication of the evaluation 
frameworks, which are now available for analysis. The scope of available material from 
the ten used initially in the OECD study has expanded to 104 when writing this thesis. 
However, the authors likely had a reason for limiting the number of categories to six in 
their study. While working with the source documents, the authors may have decided to 
merge many categories to get the total number down to six, which they considered a good 
number. Adding more categories can make the categories harder to apply in practice. 
Additional source material may also produce new categories that would need to be added 
so that one can group the activities properly. 
The second cause is something one cannot directly address by altering the categories; one 
needs to specify the more specific activities that are easier to classify into distinct 
categories. Since the listed activities have been extracted from the existing NCSS 
documents, it is not feasible to improve the situation in this NCSS document analysis 
scope. To improve the situation, one would need to develop an activity ontology that 
directly maps into the categories listed above or into another set of categories. Then the 
developers of the future NCSS documents could be encouraged to adhere to that ontology.  
It is unlikely that even a majority of the NCSS document writers would follow such a 
plan. Additionally, it is not even known whether the currently proposed categories are 
suitable to serve that purpose. It will require research to determine whether using the 
approach of guided activity design would be a beneficial activity since the NCSS 
documents are not written with the goal of being friendly to academic analysis. The 
primary purpose of NCSS documents is to communicate the strategy and the activities 
that the stakeholders should be engaged in using as straightforward terms as possible. 
That may be a more potent driver than the ability to follow predefined norms. 
As for the third case, the situation could be improved by inspecting each proposed activity 
and attempting to determine whether it is a proper activity or not. Again, there are some 
practical benefits to this, as it would enable us to recommend better activity definition 
guidelines to the authors of the future NCSS documents. As that is feasible to accomplish, 
it was performed in this thesis and is described in the following sections. 
5.3 Definition of an Activity 
We want to separate the claimed activities into two categories: actual activities and 
objectives merely presented as activities. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a precise 
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definition of activity to distinguish between them and perform the sorting objectively. 
The definition and sorting were facilitated by the constructive analysis method, combined 
with the practical inference test. 
It is necessary to use a formal way of inspecting the activities when attempting to separate 
the activities from the objectives. Therefore, assessing the activities identified in the four 
primary sources needed to be done by explicitly defining what an activity is and then 
observing whether the results of the comparisons match the definition. In this way, it is 
possible to overcome the lack of data on the previous research methods. Furthermore, this 
formal activity classification may be novel, as none of the referenced analyses disclose 
the particular research method used to arrive at their classification. 
The practical inference method can be used to distinguish between them by following the 
generic template as proposed by von Wright (Von Wright, 1963): 
“One wants to attain x. 
Unless y is done, x will not be attained. 
Therefore, y must be done.” 
Because the template proposed by Von Wright is very generic, the practical inference is 
an analytical tool that can be consistently applied for each of the proposed activities. The 
only requirement is that the activities’ evaluator has sufficient domain expertise to 
understand if the result makes logical sense. Determination of whether they are proper 
activities was done by applying practical inference clauses to the activities as proposed 
by Luiijf.  
The template requires that we see them work when placed on the second statement if they 
are considered activities. If the statement functions as intended with the proposed activity 
in the second clause, it should be possible to describe an objective that is reached due to 
that activity. On the other hand, objectives fit naturally into the first clause of the template 
and function as goals for proper activities in the second clause. 
This template can substitute any of the listed activities for y and x and see a logical fit. 
Since the activities appear to be a mix of objectives and activities, it should be possible 
to use some of them in the first clause and some in the second clause. For example, 
objective “cyber awareness” and the activity, “Education and training” does appear to fit 
the proposed structure: 
We need to improve the cyber awareness of the country, 
However, unless we engage in education and training, cyber awareness will not increase. 
Therefore, we must invest in education and training. 
This leads us to infer that the following relationship exists: 
“education and training” → “cyber awareness” 
 
Whereas “Critical Infrastructure Protection” would fit better when substituted into the 
first premise of the template: 
We need to protect critical infrastructure, 
However, unless we develop continuity and contingency plans, the critical infrastructure 
will not be sufficiently protected. 
Therefore, we must engage in the development of continuity and contingency plans. 
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Based on this observation, “Critical Infrastructure Protection” can be classified as an 
objective, and correspondingly “Education and Training” and “Continuity and 
Contingency Plans” as activities.  
“continuity and contingency plans” → “protecting critical infrastructure” 
 
While this is not a perfect way to separate the activities from the objectives, it does 
provide a straightforward method that can be consistently applied to each of the proposed 
activities.  
However, to validate this approach, it should be shown that the results would be consistent 
and that the same logical structure still works if it is reversed. Therefore, we substitute 
the supposed objective and activity into second and first clauses instead. Then, using the 
example from above, we observe that the opposite statement does not make logical sense: 
We need continuity and contingency plans, 
However, unless we are protecting critical infrastructure, there will not be proper 
continuity and contingency plans. 
Therefore, we must protect critical infrastructure. 
Protecting critical infrastructure is not necessary for continuity and contingency plans; 
the plans may well exist due to a thought experiment without ever having been put into 
use. Protecting critical infrastructure can be considered an activity – if a very high level 
one – but it does not work as a premise to developing continuity and contingency plans.  
“protecting critical infrastructure” ↛ “continuity and contingency plans” 
 
Setting up a few more examples provides additional insights into the issue. For example, 
this statement can be changed to make logical sense by exchanging the second clause 
with a more reasonable activity from our list, such as “Threat and vulnerability analysis”: 
We need continuity and contingency plans, 
However, unless there are threat and vulnerability analyses, there will not be effective 
continuity and contingency plans. 
Therefore, we must engage in threat and vulnerability analysis. 
“threat and vulnerability analyses” → “continuity and contingency plans” 
 
This change enables the statement to make logical sense and establishes how this 
approach can sort different activities based on two factors. First, if the activity is at a 
higher level of abstraction than the other, it becomes apparent during the comparison. 
Second, suppose activity is a requirement for another activity. In that case, the relation 
can be established with the comparison, and the activity that requires the other activity 
can be considered more likely to be an objective.  
Table 5 presents the classification results for all the activities extracted from Luiijf’s 
NCSS evaluation based on the methodology described above. Again, classification is 
marked as either activity or objective.  
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Table 5: Identifying objectives in Luiijf’s “Actions and Action lines.” 
 Action and action lines Classification 
1 Active / dynamic security measures Activity 
2 Awareness and training/information security 
campaign 
Activity 
3 Adaptable policy to new ICT risk Objective 
4 Continuity and contingency plans Activity 
5 Critical infrastructure protection Objective 
6 Cryptographic protection Activity 
7 Cyber arms control Objective 
8 Defense cyber operations/intervention, training, 
and exercises 
Activity 
9 Develop and share good practices Activity 
10 Economic growth Objective 
11 Education and training Activity 
12 Exercises Activity 
13 Explicit holistic view Objective 
14 Exploitation to combat threats Objective 
15 Improved security of ICT products Objective 
16 Information sharing/exchange Activity 
17 Intelligence gathering on threat actors Activity 
18 International collaboration Activity 
19 Legislation / legal framework Objective 
20 Mandating security standards Objective 
21 National detection capability Objective 
22 National response capability / ICT crisis 
management 
Objective 
23 Privacy protection Objective 
24 Promote cyber-crime convention Activity 
25 Protection of non-critical infra Objective 
26 Public-private partnership Objective 
27 Reducing adversary’s motivation and capabilities Objective 
28 Research and development Activity 
29 Resilience against disturbances/threat and 
vulnerability reduction 
Objective 
30 Secure protocols and software Objective 
31 Secure sourcing of products Objective 
32 Self-protection of the government Activity 
33 Strategic cybersecurity council Objective 
34 Threat and vulnerability analysis Activity 
35 Tracing criminals and prosecution Activity 
36 Actions defined in a SMART way? Objective 
 
This work to apply the criteria – even while applying a formal method – is intricate and 
shows that the objectives and activities are not straightforward to categorize due to the 
ambiguity in the level of abstraction. For example, whether “Exploitation to combat 
threats” is an objective or activity is highly dependable on the context. For example, for 
an organization that can engage in exploits, this would be an activity. However, in the 
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context of the NCSS document, it is much closer to an objective since the intention is to 
develop such capability. 
The above list serves as a helpful starting point for analyzing the activities and objectives 
with these caveats. Furthermore, it enables us to arrange them hierarchically and discover 
new insights from how they are organized.  
5.4 Validation of the practical inference method 
After classifying the objectives and activities from Luiijf's work with the practical 
inference method, it becomes possible to compare the results against the actual objectives 
and "tasks" defined in the Lithuanian cybersecurity strategy. Lithuania was chosen 
because very few NCSS documents summarize their objectives and activities in an easily 
accessible table. Table 6 presents the Lithuanian NCSS author's opinion on the objectives 
and activities intended to achieve those objectives.  
This comparison will serve two different functions. First, it allows us to compare the 
objectives and activities listed in the existing analyses and see if they can be connected 
with a reasonably matching counterpart in Luiijf's list. Secondly, it is possible to check 
whether the objective-analysis classification performed for the list matches the 
classification used by the authors of the Lithuanian document. If there is a good match, 
this verification gives some assurance that the applied method is sound. 
Additionally, the Lithuanian NCSS document was included in the analyses of Luiijf, 
ENISA, and Kolini but not in the OECD analysis. Having been part of the analysis of the 
referenced frameworks makes it a good review candidate. The following Table 6 is an 
extracted list from the Lithuanian Cyber Security Strategy (Government of Lithuania, 
2011) 
After mapping the Lithuanian objectives and tasks, it is possible to make observations on 
the validity. At least one related activity in Luiijf´s list for each item in the Lithuanian 
strategy indicates that the list has a fair amount of coverage over common objectives and 
activities that appear in NCSS documents. However, it was difficult to say how accurate 
that association is due to the activities being defined in ambiguous ways in several cases.  
All objectives defined in the Lithuanian NCSS were also mapped to Luiijf’s activities 
classified as objectives using the practical inference method. However, only three of the 
ten tasks from the Lithuanian NCSS were classified as activities with the practical 
inference method, while seven were classified as objectives. This result can indicate 
several things. First, it can mean that the Lithuanian NCSS proposes tasks that are closer 
to objectives from the perspective of the action and action lines as defined by Luiijf. 
Second, it can indicate that the practical inference method applied for the classification is 
not accurate enough in its current form to reveal when something classified as an 
objective is a task. 
There were 19 associations in total, of which 4, or 24% percent, were low confidence 
because of the phrasing's ambiguity (marked with a question mark in the table). On the 
other hand, these ten items classified as tasks retrieved from the Lithuanian document 
matched clearly into nine of Luiijf’s activities, with two additional uncertain matches 
against Luiijf’s list.  
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Table 6: The thirteen objectives and tasks in Lithuanian NCSS mapped into the classification created using 
the practical inference  method 










1 To ensure the security of national 
information resources 
objective 5, 25, 29, 
32 
O, O, O, A 
2 to improve the coordination and 
monitoring of electronic information 
security (cybersecurity) 
task 21(?) O 
3 to improve the regulatory framework of 
electronic information security 
(cybersecurity) 
task 19 O 
4 to expand and improve a secure national 
information infrastructure 
task 30, 32 (?) O, A 
5 to encourage the implementation of 





6 to develop international cooperation in the 
area of electronic information security 
(cybersecurity) 
task 18 A 
7 To ensure efficient functioning of critical 
information infrastructure 
objective 5 O 
8 to ensure the security of critical 
information infrastructure 
task 5 O 
9 To ensure the cybersecurity of the 
Lithuanian residents and persons staying in 
Lithuania 
objective 25 O 
10 to enhance the culture of protection of 
electronic information security 
(cybersecurity) 
task 2 A 
11 to strengthen Lithuania’s cybersecurity task 22 O 
12 to ensure the protection of Lithuania’s 
computer network (virtual cyber perimeter) 
from external cyber 
attacks 
task 29 O 
13 to reinforce the security of services 
delivered in cyberspace 
task 30, 31 O 
 
The discrepancy could mean two things; either the Lithuanian document is redundant and 
repeats similar ideas in a more verbose format. Alternatively, Luiijf’s action lines' 
expressiveness may not be enough to cover the individual activities and objectives from 
the Lithuanian strategy. For example, it would be expected that when extracting activities 
from an NCSS source, a document with 10 of those explicitly stated would result in 10 
unique items in Luiijf’s list. Unfortunately, that was not the case; the match was not 
perfect.  
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The discrepancy could mean that the authors had already written down the actions that 
Luiijf published when they arrived at the Lithuanian NCSS. Therefore, the existing labels 
did not match the ones presented in the NCSS document.  We can speculate that perhaps 
the existing labels in the generalized list present in Luiijf’s work could not be changed 
enough to accommodate the list present in the Lithuanian NCSS. 
5.5 Results of the inference classification 
The validation effort leads to an observation of the nature of objectives and activities. 
Instead of the objectives becoming ordered, these concepts form links where an activity 
can be an objective for a “lower-level” activity. The “level” in this context is about the 
level of abstraction of the concept, where higher-level concepts encompass other 
activities and form a hierarchy or a network.  
The objectives and activities often share a relationship where one is a requisite for 
another. When comparing the activities using the practical inference method, it notable 
that it is easier to notice when an objective-activity pair is mismatched – when there is no 
perceivable causal relationship. The reason for that is because we can also evaluate the 
already existing understanding of the relationships to do it. Identifying pairs where the 
causal relationships should exist – as was shown in the conflicting example – is a more 
complicated problem. Adding new objectivities and activities to the set to be classified 
also leads to potential relations' exponential growth. Evaluating the potential new 
relations requires reevaluating the entire activity base. 
Thus, it seems that the problem is not about figuring a way of sorting activities into either 
objectives or activities. Instead, the problem arises from their property: they are both 
objectives and activities simultaneously, just at different levels of abstraction. An activity 
can usually be broken down into sub-activities. In that scenario, we can see how the 
higher-level activity can become an objective for those lower-level activities. The 
interesting unknown properties of the activities are then about the level of abstraction and 
the valid causal relationships between them.  
Suppose we assume from now on that there are many different levels of abstraction 
present in the activities. In that case, that leads to the possibility of some of the activities 
subsuming other activities within their scope. Hence, it is a property of the activities that 
they may contain other activities. By identifying the causal relationships between the 
activities, we can also attempt to analyze and group them by that property. 
5.6 Mapping the Activity Relationships 
While analyzing the definition of activity and studying how to relate them to each other, 
it was noted that the relations form a network of dependency relationships. The next step 
is then to perform this kind of mapping. The work to establish the causalities is novel. 
Unfortunately, that work was not provided in any analyses referenced as the source 
material or discovered in the literature.  
The mapping of the relationships to correct activity pairs requires some domain expertise. 
As part of the research, this mapping was performed for each activity by considering the 
causal directions of these various activities' relationships. The best effort attempt was 
made to find all the causal connections between the activities. However, the result should 
not be considered a complete analysis. One must keep in mind that it continues to be a 
subjective exercise because of the activities' higher-level nature. The subjective nature 
remains even when using constructive analysis and practical inference to elucidate those 
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connections. Another person or group may arrive at a somewhat different mapping based 
on their domain expertise.  
Figure 1 is a diagram containing all the activities and the links identified from Luiijf’s 
work. One can discover exciting properties that arise from links between these activities. 
However, the work to manually map the activities' interconnectivity as a diagram based 
on Luiijf’s activities shown on the figure approaches the upper limit of what is feasible 
without switching to automated graph analysis and visualization tools. 
 
Figure 1: Relationships between the activities collected by Luiijf 
The activities in Figure 1 are color-coded by the ratio of outbound to inbound 
relationships in the graph. The darkest colored ones are the activities that have only 
inbound relationships and do not serve as prerequisites for any of the listed activities.  
These activities appear to be very high-level objectives as they have many lower-level 
requisites. On reflection, these activities could be considered to contain many of the other 
activities. The capability to contain other activities provides evidence that we should 
consider these more objective-like tasks that can only be accomplished with extensive 
coordination of people working on the requisite activities. 
The light green coded activities have only outbound relationships at the other end of the 
connectivity ratio scale. Outbound connectivity means that they have no apparent 
dependency on any of the other activities. The implication is that these are more 
foundational activities that enable others. These activities are prerequisites to all the other 
activities either directly or through secondary and tertiary connections via other activities.  
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Pruning the secondary and tertiary relations from the diagram in a graph representation is 
one factor to consider. One example of this duplicated connectivity is the activity named  
“Threat and Vulnerability analysis,” which is directly connected to “Reducing 
Adversary’s Motivation and Capabilities.” However, it is also connected to that activity 
via secondary connections through “Improved Security of ICT Products” and “Secure 
protocols and Software.” 
In this case, it makes sense to show all the identified secondary connections in the 
relationship diagram rather than only show the immediate connections because the visible 
direct relation provides relevant additional context. The justification for the existence of 
the direct link is that the “Threat and vulnerability analysis” can meaningfully contribute 
to the higher-level activity in many ways: 
 Threat and Vulnerability analysis contribute to the improved security of ICT 
products by exposing known vulnerabilities and exposing weaknesses in 
implementations. In addition, having more secure software is a deterrent to 
cybercrime because criminal activity is bound to the same economic motivators. 
 Threat and Vulnerability analysis contribute to the development of secure 
protocols and software by motivating them to address the weaknesses already in 
the development phase and by enabling developers to write more secure software 
by introducing tools that address known threats at the development time. For 
example, see OWASP top 10 (The Open Web Application Security Project, 2021) 
 Research into threats and vulnerabilities reduces the adversary’s capabilities by 
exposing known attack patterns and methods, patching the vulnerabilities, and 
providing the network administrator concrete steps to respond to the threats. It 
also prevents exploitation in secrecy and makes hacking and long-term 
exploitation more complicated because detection capabilities are usually only 
available for known vulnerabilities. 
If we removed the secondary connections, the implication would be that “Threat and 
Vulnerability Analysis” only contributes to either “Secure protocols and software” or 
“Improved Security of ICT Products,” but not directly to “Reducing Adversary’s 
Motivation and Capabilities.” However, that is not true because the activity described 
above that has a direct impact is not included in the descriptions of these two related 
activities.  
The secondary links are artifacts that arise when moving a common activity that touches 
many other activities into its separate entity. As the count of activities that are being 
considered increases, so would the presence of second and third-degree relations. 
5.7 Activity Graph 
After adding the causalities between the various activities, the resulting network has 
become a directed graph in practice. We can see that there is no single root activity or 
objective that could turn this graph into a tree-type hierarchy. There are several reasons 
for the existence of multiple top-level activities.  
 It is common for NCSS documents to define multiple objectives for the country 
to accomplish, and the diagram reflects that. However, after adding the 
relationships, we can observe that seven objectives only depend on other activities 
and do not share relationships.  
 The listed activities come from multiple NCSS documents that – while they do 
have very similar intentions – do not describe the same set goals as each country 
39 
approaches the NCSS document from their unique perspective. As a result, there 
is considerable overlap, but they diverge as realistic goals must be defined, 
considering their existing capabilities. 
In this specific version of the graph presented in Figure 2, the directed graph is also 
acyclic. However, the lack of cyclical connections should not be considered a property of 
a graph of activity relationships. There are no practical limitations as to why cyclical 
causal relationships within the various activities could not exist. This observation is 
especially relevant for the higher-level activities and objectives. It is easy to think of 
cyclic relationships, so the acyclic property of this graph is accidental. As a practical 
counter-example, one could easily and without controversy propose a cyclical 
relationship between economic growth and research and development. However, that 
relationship is not essential to document in a cybersecurity strategy document. 
The cyclical relationships are omitted in the proposed diagram because they do not 
contribute to our understanding of the functional relationships between the activities. It 
makes it easier to see the differences in the abstraction level when the relationships have 
only one direction. The lack of cyclical relationships also made it straightforward to apply 
topological sorting algorithms to the graph and sort them into a hierarchical list. 
Creating the diagram in Figure 2 provided a helpful side product; the activities – in this 
case, when manually laid out in a way that attempts to minimize overlapping connections 
to make it readable – cluster into partially overlapping sets of categories or domains. 
Reducing the number of overlapping connections by moving the activities to different 
locations generally forces them to be closer to those activities that they share most 
relationships. A more accurate representation of these grouped activities could be found 
by applying a heuristic computational algorithm to this process and having it computed 




Figure 2: Activities naturally cluster into three high-level categories 
In Figure 2, the categories have been drawn underneath the activities and labeled. Thus, 
three high-level categories can be identified, and the categories are highlighted in three 
different colors: 
1. Light green – Policies and plans for defining the national cybersecurity objectives 
2. Light blue – Activities that implement the policies in practice for improving the 
national cybersecurity 
3. Light yellow – Supporting activities and objectives for the effort of improving 
national cybersecurity 
This proximity-based alternative categorization into three groups is a less precise way to 
describe the activities than the six-category version provided by OECD. However, it 
developed organically and emerged from the data, and was worth documenting. 
Furthermore, investigating this approach by applying previously known clustering 
algorithms to the data by labeling the activities with keywords could help see how the 
activities can be split into other sets of distinct categories. 
5.8 Grouping activities by their proposed causal relationships 
In defining the activities, we also established that their relationships could group them at 
different abstraction levels. Because the connections in this graph are directed, the link's 
direction can be used as a property for sorting the graph. The grouping can be done by 
applying topological sort to the activities by their connections in space to either point up 
or connect laterally.  
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Figure 3: Activities sorted by causal relations 
The activities can be projected into a line with only outbound relationships at one end and 
only inbound relationships at the other end. The majority of the activities are positioned 
somewhere in the middle of the line. However, once we identify which activities are at 
the top of the hierarchy and which ones are at the bottom, we can infer the approximate 
level of abstraction of these individual activities. 
In Figure 3 above, the activities have been sorted by their inbound and outbound 
connections. There are only lateral links or links to a layer above. Some links cross 
multiple layers but always upwards in the diagram. The dark blue activities in this 
diagram only have links to them, never links from them to another activity. The lightest 
blue activities have no links to them, only links to other activities.  
5.9 Verifying identified activities 
The next step in drilling down into the activities would be to find out how accurately they 
have been detected in the original documents. Performing the cross-checking between the 
activity and the matching statement in the NCSS document would further clarify how 
rigorous the vetting of references was before adding to Luiijf’s table. It would also 
provide insight into whether the research methodology of classifying the activities was 
sound, regardless of the poor fit when the results were compared to the Lithuanian NCSS 
document. 
Detailed analysis of cross-checking all the listed activities from all the 19 separate NCSS 
documents is beyond the scope of this thesis, but tracking one of the less common 
activities in documents is a way to see some examples of the results. Having fewer 
occurrences would also mean that the activity must be fitted to cover a less generalized 
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case. In this kind of scenario, the activity should match more closely with the source 
document. If there are no matches, it will indicate that the activities may not have been 
appropriately captured.  
Example: “Active/dynamic security measures” are listed as having been found in the 
NCSS documents for Estonia, India, Japan, and the USA, which provides a sample set 
for review analysis.  
From the Estonian NCSS, the closest match to this activity would be the following 
statement: “Civil, military, and international cooperation based on the resources at the 
disposal of the state must also function adequately in cyberspace – with regards to the 
warning, deterrence, and active defense.” (Retel, 2014) 
The exact phrasing of the activity does not appear to match well with the proposed 
activity. In India's case, no statement matching this activity could be found from the 
NCSS document in the review. It is not clear how the author arrived at their conclusion 
that the Indian NCSS mentions this activity. (Government of India, 2013) 
In Japan’s NCSS document under the heading “Basic policy,” the author mentions the 
importance of “Establishing active rather than passive information security measures.” 
They continue to describe this in the following way: “Conventional information security 
measures have tended to remain as symptomatic treatment that addresses individual risks 
whenever they arise, and often fail to address the actual cause. As ICT advances, 
information security measures that will 3 bring fundamental solutions to such problems 
must be strategically identified. At the same time, by utilizing the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) cycle and other methods, organizational structures that enable entities to 
actively implement new information security measures—differing from the current 
passive attitude—must be established.” (NISC, 2010, p. 2) 
This passage could be the origin of the activity that Luiijf calls “active/dynamic security 
measures” since it is the only one that uses the word “actively.” Although it is not as 
clearly spelled out in other Estonia and India documents, they were included under this 
header. 
The lack of an exact source suggests that the authors have been creative and liberal in 
interpreting and selecting the activities and that the activities were not necessarily spelled 
out explicitly in the NCSS documents. For example, activity may describe the document's 
intention spread over paragraphs rather than in a clearly defined statement. If the selection 
criteria are not strictly applied, it is pretty challenging to prove that the authors of the 
NCSS document had that explicit motivation for each activity.  
Establishing whether this is just a single incident of a low-quality match or an indicator 
of a general trend requires a more careful analysis of all the referenced documents. 
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6. Discussion 
Several exciting topics arose during the research, and there are also new contributions to 
the research. The chosen research methods were successful to a degree, but there is still 
significant room for improvement. Significant limitations related to the prior research 
were also discovered, but those limitations also provide a helpful way to think about the 
results. 
The driver for using the constructive analysis method to define the objectives and 
activities was the consistent inability to evaluate the research methods or reproduce any 
of the prior research in this domain. None of the previous research or publications 
documented in their methodology used to arrive at the result presented in the publication 
in sufficient detail.  
In rigorous research, one should be able to do so by applying the same method, and this 
restriction sets boundaries on how reliable the source material can be. While this research 
into NCSS documents does not necessarily carry the same weight as other natural and 
social sciences where the problem of replicability is an actual crisis, the concern may 
extend here as well. The constructive analysis is a way to try to establish a reproducible 
method of analyzing the contents of NCSS documents; anyone can apply it and see if they 
get the same result as this work. It would be great to see future research in this field 
publish their methodology in full. 
6.1 Understanding activities related to cybersecurity strategy  
Understanding the causal relationship between the activities identified during the research 
for this thesis is a novel contribution that has not been seen in prior published research 
based on searches in the electronic journal databases. While the analysis was done within 
the limiting boundaries of the existing and partly aged source material, the discussed 
objectives and activities continue to be relevant today. All of the studied material was 
included in the NCSS evaluation frameworks research used as primary source material. 
A couple of valuable observations can be made from the results of the analyzed activities.  
First, there is a division of activities into groups; some are prerequisites for multiple other 
activities and other activities that require supporting activities. The delineation is gradual, 
and the activities towards the top of the ranking hierarchy are more likely to be high-level 
objectives than activities. However, this may not be a meaningful metric since being 
activity or objective is based on the evaluation method used in this work. The 
classification depends on how many dependencies an activity has with other activities or 
how high the level of abstraction is. The status is probably not stable and is also likely to 
change as more relevant objectives and activities are introduced to the analysis.  
Second, based on the analysis, it is prudent to propose that a more detailed understanding 
of dependencies in this kind of documents could be a significant resource for designing 
strategies. The knowledge of these links already exists in the expertise of the people who 
are familiar with this domain. For example, the objective “Improved security of ICT 
products” is dependent on the activity “Secure protocols and software.” Most people 
familiar with the cybersecurity domain would agree with this assertion and recognize the 
dependency direction between these activities. Many of the other links are not so obvious 
and only become apparent when the whole dependency graph is examined as a whole. 
Ferreting out and presenting these links describes our current understanding of this 
domain in a very compact representation. 
44 
Third, because NCSS documents are developed for a wide variety of audiences, from 
high-level decision-makers to those implementing individual activities, an objective for 
another is an activity for the other. Therefore, a resulting relationship diagram helpful to 
one user may not work for another and may include unnecessary detail. Therefore, the 
intended audience should be taken into account in future work. 
6.2 Differences between Luiijf´s and Lithuanian document 
We can safely say that the listed activities in Luiijf’s work are unlikely to be a complete 
set. However, since no other sources could be found that would attempt to do a similar 
analysis, and the other primary sources did not claim to find the same activities, that 
assertion cannot be verified at this time. Furthermore, making that claim would require 
replicating the prior studies and reviewing all the currently available NCSS documents. 
As a thought exercise, there are at least three likely sources of additional objectives and 
activities that would meaningfully contribute to this analysis: 
1. The authors of the evaluation studies may not have reliably noted all the objectives 
and particularly the activities in the NCSS documents that they studied. 
2. Suppose the original analysis studies would be extended into the rest of the 
available source material (NCSS documents from other countries). In that case, 
more activities that match the definition would likely be added to the list. 
3. Many countries have published one or more new editions of their cybersecurity 
strategy since the prior research was published. Those new editions are likely 
sources of new activities or existing activities that have been further refined. 
The existing NCSS documents also most likely do not contain all the relevant activities 
that would positively contribute to national cybersecurity. The development of the 
cybersecurity field both produces new insights and methods of improvement. More 
activities can and will be added as new countries develop their documents and produce 
new revisions of their respective NCSS documents.  
6.3 Applicability of Kolini’s LDA analysis 
Even though all the member countries whom OECD investigated in their work are listed 
in Kolini’s analysis, there is a five-year gap between the analyses. Therefore, it is possible 
that the understanding of the relevant cybersecurity topics in these countries may be 
different when Kolini’s analysis was performed. It is also possible that the second version 
of an NCSS has been published during that time. However, it was not feasible to 
investigate which versions of the NCSS documents were included in Kolini’s data set as 
they do not list the NCSS documents in the references. In addition, Kolini only mentions 
a summary of included countries rather than the actual documents in their article's data 
description section. 
The second factor to consider is that the machine learning approach's outcome is 
challenging because we do not know what words, groupings, or clusters are left out from 
the results when the algorithm produces the desired number of clusters. Compared to 
human analysis, it is not straightforward to determine, for example, if some relevant 
clusters or topics make sense and are important, but where the content in the documents 
was spread so thinly that the algorithm did not catch it.  
There is some evidence of this type of omission when evaluating the results. For example, 
Kolini’s word clusters do not appear to produce a topic that could be labeled “economic 
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development,” even though that topic or the underlying idea is present in most of the 
NCSS documents published. The economic factors are prominent enough in the NCSS 
documents that they have been studied, for example, by the NATO CCDCOE center 
(Brangetto and Kert-Saint Aubyn, 2014).  Luiijf also made this observation in their 
analysis. (Luiijf et al., 2013, p. 11)  
One of the LDA analysis parameters is the desired number of clusters that the output 
should have, significantly affecting the results. Kolini and Janczewski settled on ten 
clusters in their work after studying the experiments' results with 5, 10, 15, 20, 50, and 
100 clusters. The optimal number of topics for a particular context depends on the size 
and variability of the source corpus and the analyst's subjective interpretation. It is 
difficult to say definitively whether a better result would be achieved using, for example, 
8 or 12 clusters instead of 10. These clusters can be considered topics for our purposes 
after being classified and named by the researchers. It is always up to the human analyst 
to assign a meaningful label encompassing the list's terms. The algorithm is unable to 
define the topic that the cluster represents on its own.  
 
The second apparent omission is the lack of category that could be labeled “Intelligence 
gathering and sharing,” represented by activities #16 and #17 in Luiijf’s list. In the 19 
NCSS documents, activity #16 is mentioned in 11, and activity #17 in 7 documents. We 
can extrapolate that the activities should exist in 33 to 50 percent of the more extensive 
selection of documents that Kolini analyzed. Nevertheless, Kolini’s approach does not 
lift this cluster as part of the ten proposed clusters. It appears unlikely that the source of 
the difference is that the 41 additional NCSS documents analyzed had suddenly stopped 
including intelligence gathering as an activity. That would need to be verified by 
reviewing the entire 60 NCSS document source material to see if that topic can be found. 
The inability to produce this category in the results is a significant drawback for the 
analysis method. Those clusters could appear if the algorithm were directed to produce, 
for example, a set of 15 clusters. Determining the optimum number of clusters by an 
algorithm is also subject to ongoing research. Heuristic approaches that produce a stable 
result could have been applied to the evaluated study. Such methods have already been 
proposed and tested. (Zhao et al., 2015) 
6.4 Standardization of an NCSS document 
Studying the analyses and the NCSS documents published by countries makes it clear 
that there is no standardized way of defining a national cybersecurity strategy. Instead, 
each country develops its own. While many of them have done extensive research on 
documents released by other countries, each document is unique in both format and 
content. They draw influence from documents published by other countries and draw 
some language from previously published documents, as shown in Kolini’s research 
about NCSS document “family tree.” (Kolini & Janczewski, 2017.)  
It would be beneficial for the NCSS documents to spell out the dependencies between the 
activities and objectivities for the standardization of objectives and activities. Explaining 
the requirements was partly done in the Lithuanian strategy, but it is not a common 
practice.  
It remains to be seen whether the cybersecurity strategy “Capability Maturity Model for 
Nations” made by GCSCC will significantly impact national strategies' harmonization. 
ENISA’s work on providing additional guidance on writing NCSS documents may also 
have harmonizing effect over time, particularly in European countries. The influence of 
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their guidelines could be researched by studying the evolution of the future NCSS 
documents. One way to analyze the impact would be applying Kolini’s document 
hierarchy classification scheme for documents published more than one year after the 
model was published or by surveying the authors of the more recent documents on which 
frameworks influenced their process. 
It would be beneficial if a standard method of defining the document could be adopted to 
be more comfortable for countries to review their strategies in the context of other 
countries' strategies. This kind of standardization may evolve and can be a realistic 
prospect. The documents are meant to be adapted to the countries' changing requirements 
and generally designed to be updated roughly every five years, so there is ample space 
for finding common approaches.  
6.5 Validity 
Thorough validation of the extent to which the NCSS documents were intended to 
describe activities would have required extensive additional study of the national 
strategies. In addition, the validation would be challenging to accomplish with the 
available resources because the implementation plans are not necessarily translated to 
English. Usually, only the strategy document itself is translated as implementation is only 
for local interest.  
For this study's purposes, it did not significantly impact since source material claimed to 
have extracted many activities from the documents. Nevertheless, there was also source 
material in the NCSS documents that did define activities, so the starting point was valid.  
Since none of the studies providing the source material describe how they arrived at their 
definitions, it is impossible to directly assess the quality of those definitions used for 
identifying activities for the studies. The lack of visibility brings ambiguities to the 
analyses performed in this research. However, it did not make it impossible to perform 
the analyses needed to answer the research questions. 
One problem in accomplishing activity definition in practice is that the activities' 
descriptions are too truncated, often reduced to the minimum amount of words necessary 
to convey the intent. However, being so brief, it is often too short for the reader to have 
confidence in the meaning.  
There could be many reasons for this conciseness: authors preferred concise terms or 
wanted to fit them neatly into a table in the publication. Thus, it would likely be possible 
to extract more verbose descriptions by going back to the source publications. However, 
given the constraints, it would be impossible to replicate the results as the material and 
research method have not been disclosed for any source analyses. Therefore, future 
research into these topics should carefully disclose the methodologies used for content 
extraction and analysis so that there is enough transparency to evaluate the work. In this 




This thesis set out the study the methods and frameworks previously used to analyze 
national cybersecurity documents. NCSS documents have a general goal of improving 
society's cyber resilience and making sure that technology can be leveraged to its full 
potential to advance the economy in an environment full of risks. 
Since the documents are built around a central theme and ostensibly have the same goal, 
they should be similar in theory. That implies that review frameworks should have no 
trouble finding similarities among the NCSS documents.  
Analysis of the results showed that was not the case. The results of previous analyses 
were not easily comparable and approached the research from very different perspectives. 
Previous frameworks were opaque in the research methodology on how they selected 
objectives and activities from the source material and produced inconsistent results that 
proved difficult to replicate by looking at the source material. The activities and 
objectives extracted from the documents in separate analyses did not correspond to each 
other. Perhaps more alarmingly, they did not always even correspond with the source 
material in the sampled cybersecurity documents mentioned as sources. 
Performing a deeper analysis of the extracted activities from the documents enabled the 
extraction and examination of relationships between them. One of the research questions 
was about figuring out how the activities relate to each other. The work on that produced 
the activity graph and the resulting hierarchical arrangement of the activities by their 
abstraction level. Understanding the hierarchy and relations becomes much more concrete 
when described in this kind of graphical representation. That is a valuable finding because 
there has not been published research into these activities since 2013. Kolini’s work from 
2017 is the only exception, but the research approach is so different that it does not extend 
the earlier work, rather than providing another perspective. Meanwhile, up to a hundred 
national strategies have been published globally, affecting both policies at the very center 
of cybersecurity preparedness and resiliency. 
The resulting information about the activities and objectives' dependencies could be 
helpful when designing new implementation plans for cybersecurity strategies. The 
knowledge base from the graph produced in this research could be used for multiple 
purposes. For example, it is essential to know that the proposed objectives and activities 
are reasonable and that all the prerequisites are known before the publication of a strategy. 
Otherwise, the publisher is at risk of including impossible objectives because of a lack of 
knowledge, organizations, policies, training, or other prerequisites. In that scenario, it 
makes more sense to set less ambitious goals or document that achieving the prerequisite 
goals is needed to achieve the overarching goal stated in the document. It also makes 
more sense to emphasize the achievable but essential objectives.  
A shared body of knowledge about objectives and proposed activities in cybersecurity 
strategies would be helpful. It makes little sense that these are objectives are developed 
from scratch or by taking another country’s document as a base and then customizing it 
to the situation, which seems to happen according to the family tree of NCSS documents 
as shown by Kolini. A general framework would be more effective, cover more situations, 
and provide neutral guidance to the practitioners, who could then choose to include the 
parts they need. The work that began in this thesis could contribute to that by providing 
a seed for the objectives and activities commonly present in NCSS. In addition, should 
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that work compile the knowledge base from scratch, the constructive analysis method 
could start working out the relationships from a larger corpus of the source material. 
Knowing which activities depend on each other could also influence policy decisions on 
what activities should be defined in a strategy. Unfortunately, the writing of these 
strategies currently relies on the expertise of the individual contributors that typically 
write them in committees. While they are likely to have tremendous personal experience 
in cybersecurity and their particular fields, cybersecurity as a domain is vast. No single 
person can grasp all of it and be aware of all the dependencies and relationships necessary 
to advance particular agendas.  
For example, suppose that an objective cannot be achieved in the expected lifetime of the 
strategy because there are intermediate steps that depend on other capabilities. It does not 
make sense to include that as an objective in the strategy rather than adding the 
intermediate goals that will later lead to the desired state. Moreover, those intermediate 
steps should be documented so that those who implement the strategy can take them into 
account in their implementation plans. 
While relationship graphs are not new, the ones produced in this work appear to be novel 
to a cybersecurity strategy. The graph linking the activities to each other and labeling the 
activities into three groups can inform the developer of the strategy's objectives and 
priorities. The benefit for the reader is getting a quick overview without having to read 
through large amounts of other countries’ strategies and synthesizing the knowledge for 
themselves.  
The guidance available from frameworks such as the Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations produced by GCSCC is helpful. However, its contribution is to list a set of 
dimensions and aspects of those that can be measured objectively. Measurement in these 
dimensions leads to aspiration to improve on the areas, but there is little guidance on 
defining objectives and actions to progress cybersecurity to the desired level. That would 
be the content in the NCSS documents, especially in the implementation plans of those 
strategies, but there are few publications in this area.  
7.1 Future research – Extensive activity and objective mapping 
The produced graphs could be enhanced in several different ways. First, the activities 
were sourced from the source research done in 2013 and only included 19 NCSS 
documents as a source. Now that more than a hundred NCSS have been published and up 
to three iterative revisions for certain countries' strategies, a wealth of new source material 
could be mined for more content and improve the results. 
In this thesis, mapping was performed for activities and objects collected from the 
existing analyses performed for a subset of NCSS documents available at that time. That 
knowledge graph can already be analyzed for insights. However, it could be significantly 
expanded if it considered all the activities and objectives present in a current generation 
of about one hundred NCSS documents. These kinds of links can be discovered in 
multiple ways. One such way would have been reading through the source material and 
identifying when activity or objective has explicitly stated dependencies. That could be 
done for all or for a subset of currently existing NCSS documents, which would create a 
knowledge base of consensus-based opinion on these dependencies.  
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The knowledge graph could also be used when evaluating NCSS documents from the 
perspective of understanding gaps in the implementation plan. The implementation plan 
needs to take into account what are the prerequisites for achieving the strategic objectives.  
7.2 Future research - Generational document analysis 
The number and corpus of second and third-generation NCSS documents released by 
countries already enable generational difference analysis of the released documents. The 
analysis could be done using Kolini’s LDA method and comparing the resulting 
categories produced by the algorithm. One could also perform manual analysis for 
documents sorted by generation using the document review method such as the one used 
by Luiijf. 
It would also be fascinating to see the results of new research of topic modeling that would 
include all the currently existing 104 documents. That would then also provide the 
complete cluster data sets for a range of 10-20 clusters. In this way, one could analyze the 
produced clusters more thoroughly and determine the topics in more detail. 
Another interesting approach would be performing an analysis where NCSS documents 
are bucketed in time-based generations, such as five years each. One could then compare 
those NCSS documents released between 2007-2011 with the strategies released in the 
2012-2016 and 2017-2021 time periods. Results of both framework-based and machine 
learning-based analyses would provide insight into this domain's general development. It 
could expose how different prominent topics are between the document generations and 
how common it is to find those topics in that generation's NCSS documents. Currently, 
there is very little research on how NCSS documents evolve, how the objectives defined 
in them evolve, whether some of those objectives are more successful than others, or if 
actions designed to reach those objectives are functional or not. Research and 
documentation of these areas would provide fascinating insights and assist nations in a 
significant way of choosing and plotting their path by developing the national 
cybersecurity strategy. 
One aspect of whether an activity is well defined depends on the perspective of the 
audience. There may be different perspectives that exist at different levels of the 
government, between the private and public sector, or industries, and so on. Additional 
insight into the proposed activities' quality could be gained if the proposed activities 
would be studied from different perspectives and quantified on whether it adequately 
describes a relevant activity. The perspective-based analyses would quickly form another 
research project in its own right. 
This topic is fascinating and could be significantly expanded by further analysis into the 
activities discovered in the national documents that were not available when Luiijf’s 
second expanded analysis was performed in 2013. Discovering all of the proposed 
activities and the causal relationships of the activities in the complete corpus of NCSS 
documents available now would provide significant insight into which activities or groups 
of activities should be included in the NCSS documents under development. In addition, 
it would assist in the NCSS design and drafting process by providing the author ways to 
compare their proposed activities with the strategy's improvement goals and the current 
state of the matters in their countries. 
The LDA-based machine-learning approach lays the foundation for this. It can already 
build a ”family tree” of related NCSS documents, which may tell what existing 
documents were used as inspiration when writing the strategy. Kolini demonstrated that 
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the research was not verified by interviewing the authors to discover if those associations 
were just artifacts of their topic modeling methodology. It would have been a significant 
verification of the automated research into this topic. Unfortunately, that research into the 
currently available documents was outside of this thesis's scope.  
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